The second lesson-from-history article examined the Bentley Prior decision-making environment more closely, at the center of an integrated air defense system, and part of an overall sense-and-respond system used by Royal Air Force (RAF) Fighter Command under Air Marshall Hugh Dowding.
The third lesson-from-history article examined the supply chain run by Whitehall and how Lord Beaverbrook introduced the concepts of supply chain agility (modularity, standardization, simplification and integration) to improve the efficiency of the supply chain.
In May 1940, Churchill, faced with an imminent invasion, ran a project that integrated four areas into a solution. These were all at different levels of development and maturity, and included Bentley Prior, the Whitehall supply chain for fighter production, Bletchley Park and Storey's Gate (see Figure 1). This fourth lesson-from-history article examines in more detail the third area, Bletchley Park, the role of intelligence and ultimately knowledge management.
Figure 1: Churchill's Solution Consisted of Four Integrated Areas
"Knowledge is power." A recent quote, or is it? Well, it was actually coined in 1597 by Sir Francis Bacon, English author, courtier and philosopher. In the military, knowledge has always been important, especially in decision-making. In recent decades, knowledge, better known as "intelligence," has emerged as one of the most vital military assets. Although we may perceive the concept of military intelligence as old as warfare itself, this article presents an example of the industrial production of it back in May 1940 to respond to the demands of a nation in crisis. This was the first real, concerted effort to introduce mechanization and a level of automation into the production of intelligence. Electromechanical computers would be incorporated into the process of information gathering, collection, collation, deciphering and interpretation. Within an incredibly short time frame, Bletchley Park revolutionized modern warfare, specifically, how air wars were going to be fought from that point on.
Churchill had to use the limited resources he had at his disposal in the most effective way. He could only do that through the greater use of organizational and enemy intelligence. Knowing the extent of enemy preparation and activity would provide the necessary insight to where and how the enemy was likely to strike next. Armed with this, Churchill could then better target resources to meet the invasion threat.
Churchill knew the value of intelligence and was shaped by his previous experiences from the First World War. First, the lack of a central policy undermined coordination of resources and prolonged the UK's response as well as the war. Second, the lack of reliable intelligence proved a major undoing for him at Gallipoli in 1915, which crucified his career in the short term. Churchill's plan to defeat Turkey by sending in British warships and troops to stand off Constantinople failed miserably. As the troops hit the beaches at Gallipoli, without adequate ground intelligence, they had nowhere to go and were gunned down by the Turkish army that commanded the heights and overall terrain of the beaches.
As Churchill came to power in May 1940, he became aware of the secret establishment at Bletchley Park, which collected and deciphered encrypted enemy communications or Enigma codes under the overall command of Stewart Menzies, the director of Military Intelligence (MI6). Bletchley Park was opened in 1938 when the Government Codes & Ciphers School was moved there to test its suitability for warfare. The mansion (see Figure 2) was located midway between the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, a fertile community and source of mathematicians and logicians, all ideal code-breaker candidates.
Figure 2: Bletchley Park Mansion
The first breakthrough came through in July 1939 when Polish cryptographers shared their Enigma work and results with the French and British. They had obtained examples of the commercial Enigma machine and managed to break the codes. They also had an idea for developing a mechanical method for finding the Enigma ring settings to speed up deciphering. The Polish work gave the Bletchley organization a great boost, and in January 1940, code-breakers in Hut 6 made their first break into Enigma. But Bletchley Park was still a fledgling and manual operation, very laborious, and it was hit-and-miss whether the messages could be deciphered before an event would actually happen. An electromechanical machine could greatly reduce the odds, and thereby the time required, to break the daily-changing Enigma keys. Work started on this under the leadership of the renowned Alan Turing (father of the Turing Machine and pioneer of computing).
Figure 3: Enigma Code
During the Battle of France in May 1940, the value of deciphered enemy communications started to emerge, especially from the German Army when field commanders filed situation reports to headquarters each day. This allowed the British commanders to check on their own information and build up a more accurate picture. This gave great confidence in the potential of this intelligence and greatly raised Bletchley's profile with the military.
In May 1940, several new prototypes of electromechanical machines, or Bombes (see Figure 4), were completed, based on the original Polish idea, and initial results proved very promising as the operation of deciphering dramatically sped up. If messages were decrypted in a 24-hour window, this would provide invaluable information on enemy intent and threats, and allow defensive positions to be taken prior to any enemy offensive. The odds against breaking Enigma were a staggering 150 million to one, so it was unlikely this source of intelligence would come under suspicion as it was considered highly secure by the Axis.
