The second lesson-from-history article examined the Bentley Priory decision-making environment more closely, at the center of an integrated air defense system, and part of an overall sense-and-respond system used by Royal Air Force (RAF) Fighter Command.
In May 1940, Churchill, faced with an imminent invasion, ran a project that integrated four areas in a solution. These were all at different levels of development and maturity, and included Bentley Priory, the Whitehall supply chain for fighter production, Bletchley Park and Storey's Gate (see Figure 1). This third lesson-from-history article examines in more detail the second area, the supply chain run by Whitehall.

Figure 1: Churchill's Solution Consisted of Four Integrated Areas
Although we may perceive the concept of a demand-driven supply chain as relatively modern, this article presents an example of how one was established back in May 1940, far earlier than envisaged, to respond to the demands of a nation in crisis. Within an incredibly short time frame, Whitehall revolutionized the fighter supply chain and turned it to a demand-driven model, driven by and synchronized closely to Bentley Priory. The example reveals how the concepts of supply chain visibility and agility, just-in-time (JIT) manufacturing and zero inventories were introduced to offset a pending disaster.
In the last two weeks of May 1940, the RAF sustained massive losses of close to 500 operational fighters in the air battle over Flanders and France. With 620 operational fighters, the RAF was well below its set target (in 1939) of 1,200 fighters, thought to be the minimum number to win an air battle over the United Kingdom (UK). The fighters were outnumbered by a ratio of 2:1, and the RAF was about 50 percent under strength, with very little time to increase manufacturing output. The fighter production rate was still struggling to meet targets of 200-300 fighters per month (February, 141; March, 177; April, 256). Even a new Spitfire fighter factory had failed to produce anything in six months, plagued by the complexity of the Spitfire's elliptical wings and manufacturing practices that had changed little since the First World War and biplanes.
Churchill had to respond to the invasion threat and jump-start fighter production immediately. He could not fight an air battle with aircraft production at these low levels. The problem was that the UK economy was, in spite of everything, still on a civilian footing. Household goods and new automobiles were even being built and diverting critical manufacturing resources and raw materials. Churchill had to prioritize fighter production over everything, even bomber production, which the Air Ministry had been prioritizing.
Churchill wrestled fighter production out of the control of the Air Ministry by creating the Ministry of Aircraft production and appointed Canadian Lord Beaverbrook as its minister. Churchill gave him a clear mandate to transform fighter production. Beaverbrook, a newspaper magnate, was a no nonsense businessman who could cut through the civil service red tape. Beaverbrook's goal was to accelerate production, improve the supply chain, and lock-step it to the daily demands of RAF Fighter Command.
Beaverbrook introduced the concepts of supply chain agility (modularity, standardization, simplification and integration) to improve the efficiency of the supply chain.
Expertise and best practices were brought in from the automobile manufacturing industry to speed up fighter production specifically production line techniques. Modularity was introduced where reusable parts and subassemblies could be redeployed from bomber production. These could be switched back with changing needs after the air battle.
The supply chain was revamped to improve agility and speed up delivery output. Production of fighters was limited from five to two proven types, the Hurricane and Spitfire, which were already in quantity production. Fewer aircraft types left in production eliminated some business processes. Standardization provided everything needed for Hurricane and Spitfire production so it could be immediately stepped up. Standardization safeguarded the supply of materials and equipment already allocated for these types and made it possible to divert from other types the necessary parts, stocks of materials and components, and reserves of production capacity for immediate use. Aircraft parts were sourced from hundreds of large and small suppliers to avoid bottlenecks, ensure availability, and a continuous flow.
Fighter production was simplified by reducing the number of small and disparate components by concentrating on completed subassemblies (fuselage frames, undercarriages, instrument panels, engines) shipped straight from suppliers. This reduced complexity from business process execution.
Business processes were mapped out and infrastructure components for fighter production were connected (see Figure 2). This better understanding of the production process allowed the production line to be broken out from large-scale factories to much smaller facilities like garages that could be dispersed across geographic locations, creating a network of integrated manufacturing. This was useful as all fighter production facilities were top priority bombing targets for the Luftwaffe. In addition, new processes were introduced that eliminated the elliptical wing production problems.
Indicators were collected from key points in the supply chain, along with aggregated metrics to provide greater overall visibility and to enhance decision-making.
Further, Beaverbrook had good relationships with industrialists in the U.S. and leveraged these to secure supplies of precious raw materials and key parts and subassemblies.

Figure 2: Whitehall's Fighter Supply Chain Processes Laid Out
With raw materials scarce and expensive, a Civilian Repair Organization was established to recover downed pilots and aircraft. Using small civilian workshops and garages, recovered aircraft were either immediately repaired or cannibalized for spare parts. In such a lean operation, even enemy planes were salvaged and thrown into smelters to provide raw materials for new fighters.









